Closure of autobiographical memories: the effects of written recounting from first or third person visual perspective by Crawley, Rosalind
Crawley, Rosalind (2010) Closure of autobiographical memories: the effects of 
written recounting from first or third person visual perspective. Memory, 18 (8). 
pp. 900-17. ISSN 0965-8211 
Downloaded from: http://sure.sunderland.ac.uk/1318/
Usage guidelines







Closure of autobiographical memories: The effects of written recounting from first- or 




Ros A. Crawley  
University of Sunderland, U.K. 
           
 
Short title: Visual perspective and memory closure  
 
Address for correspondence:  Dr. Ros Crawley 
     Department of Psychology, 
     University of Sunderland,  
     David Goldman Building,  
     St. Peter's Way,  
     Sunderland, SR6 0DD 
     U.K. 
     tel: +44 191 5152522 





This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Memory: Crawley, 
R. (2010) Closure of autobiographical memories: the effects of written recounting 
from first or third person visual perspective. Memory, 18 (8). pp. 900-17 available 







Autobiographical memories are recalled with varying degrees of psychological 
closure. Closure is a subjective assessment of how far a remembered experience 
feels resolved, and it has been suggested that one predictor of closure is the amount 
of emotional detail in the memory. Study 1 examined which aspect of emotional detail 
is important for closure and showed that open and closed negative memories were 
distinguished by ratings of emotion evoked during recall, not by remembered emotion 
from the time of the event. The recall of open memories was accompanied by more 
intense, more negative, and less positive emotion than the recall of closed memories.  
Biased retelling of memories has been shown to influence closure and on the basis 
of evidence that third-person recall serves a distancing function, Study 2 examined 
whether instructions to repeatedly recount an open memory from a third-person 
perspective would increase closure compared with a single or repeated recounting 
from a first-person perspective. While repeated third-person recounting had the 
greatest influence on closure, there were also increases in the first-person recounting 
groups. The results suggest that closure can be increased by reporting memories in 
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Beike and Wirth-Beaumont (2005) demonstrated that memories vary in psychological 
closure, a subjective state accompanying recall that reflects the degree to which the 
recalled experience feels resolved and understood. Closure is generally considered 
to bHDGHVLUDEOHJRDO EHFDXVHRSHQPHPRULHV LQFUHDVHDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V UXPLQDWLYH
self-awareness which, in the long term, may be associated with anxiety and 
depression, and a decrease in self-esteem (Beike, Kleinknecht, & Wirth-Beaumont, 
2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Understanding more about what determines 
perceived closure and ways in which memory closure might be facilitated is the aim 
of the studies reported here. Study 1 examines the way in which emotional detail is 
related to perceived memory closure, and Study 2 investigates the influence of 
UHSHDWHGO\ ZULWLQJ DERXW DQ RSHQ PHPRU\ IURP DQ RXWVLGHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH RQ LWV
perceived closure. 
 
Beike and Wirth-Beaumont (2005) described closure in various ways 
including the degree to which a memory feels settled and behind one D µFORVHG
ERRN¶ OLNH DQFLHQW KLVWRU\ and no longer like unfinished business. The degree of 
closure is not determined simply by the kind of event remembered (Beike et al., 
2004) or by the degree of emotion at the time of the event. Memories of experiences 
that evoked intense emotion when originally experienced may be remembered later 
with more or less closure, on a continuum from open to closed. Across four studies, 
Beike and Wirth-Beaumont showed that both pleasant and unpleasant event 
memories vary in perceived closure, that males usually rate memories as more 
closed than females, that older and more pleasant event memories are usually 
associated with greater closure, and that open memories are more frequently thought 
about than closed memories. Their main aim, however, was to test the prediction that 
perceived memory closure depends on the degree to which a constructed memory is 
emotionally detailed. Over time, memory for the emotional intensity with which events 
were originally experienced fades, with faster fading of negative than positive 
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emotion (Holmes, 1970; Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997). In Conway and Pleydell-
3HDUFH¶V  WKHRU\ RI DXWRELRJUDSKLFDO PHPRU\, fading affect results from 
retrieval processes that reduce emotional detail in order to protect the Self-Memory 
System from the potentially disruptive effects of reliving the original emotion during 
recall. Beike and Wirth-Beaumont tested the hypothesis that it is low emotional detail 
in a constructed memory that results in memory closure and, on the basis of their 
findings, concluded that while properties of the remembered event such as recency 
and valence are influential, the amount of emotional detail in a memory is an 
important predictor of memory closure.  
 
Beike and Wirth-Beaumont operationalised the degree to which a memory 
was emotionally detailed using two measures; the number of emotions reported 
when participants were asked to list the feelings in their memory for the event, and 
the subjective rating of the intensity of emotion evoked during recall. They argued for 
a OLQNEHWZHHQWKHWZRRQWKHEDVLVRI%RZHU¶VQHWZRUNWKHRU\saying that the 
autonoetic experience of emotion during recall is intimately linked to the proportion of 
emotional detail associated with the memory. Across the four studies they report, 
both measures were related to closure. For example, in their preliminary study, both 
pleasant and unpleasant open memories were rated as evoking more intense 
emotion during recall than closed memories, while in Study 1, the number of feelings 
remembered from the event predicted D PHPRU\¶V FORVXUH UDWLQJ ,Q 6WXG\ 
participants recalled one open and one closed memory either from the recent past 
(the last twelve monWKV RU IURP WKH GLVWDQW SDVW ³a long time agR´  Regression 
analyses revealed that while closure ratings for recent memories were predicted by 
rated emotional intensity during recall, closure ratings for distant memories were 
predicted by the number of feelings listed from the time of the event.  Although both 
measures emerged as related to closure across their four studies, they 
acknowledged that the correspondence between them was weak. They suggest this 
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might be explained by an influence of memory recency such that subjective 
emotional detail (measured by rated intensity of emotion during recall) determines 
perceived closure of recent events while objective emotional detail (measured by the 
number of feelings listed from the time of the event) determines perceived closure of 
distant events.   
 
However, the relationship between emotional detail and perceived closure 
deserves further attention because the measures used by Beike and Wirth-Beaumont 
confounded the aspect of emotional detail measured (emotional intensity or variety of 
feelings) with the time the emotion was aroused (at encoding or during retrieval). 
Both their measures could be applied to encoding or retrieval yet Beike and Wirth-
Beaumont consider each in relation to only one aspect of memory: the rating of 
emotional intensity in relation to the time of recall, and the variety of feelings in 
relation to the remembered event.  Thus it is unclear whether their suggestion that 
perceived closure for recent and distant memories is determined by subjective and 
objective emotional detail respectively relates to a difference between intensity of 
emotion and variety of emotions felt, or a difference between remembered emotional 
detail from the time of the event and emotion felt during recall. In fact, they did 
measure the subjective rating of emotional intensity during the original experience, 
and found no difference between open and closed memories, but they do not appear 
to consider this a measure relevant to emotional detail. Thus there is a need to 
examine more closely the relationship between perceived closure and the different 
ways in which emotional detail can be measured and this was the aim of Study 1.  
 
In light of the link between open memories, rumination, and mental health, it 
is important to find ways to help people increase the closure of troubling memories. 
Study 2 investigates whether memory closure can be increased by writing about an 
open unpleasant memory from the third-person perspective. Beike and Wirth-
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Beaumont (2005) used a biased retelling procedure in their final study and showed 
that the way a memory is retold can influence its perceived closure. Biased retelling 
influences not only what is reported during retelling but also the amount and type of 
information that is later recalled (Dudukovic, Marsh, & Tversky, 2004; Tversky & 
Marsh, 2000) so has the potential to influence closure over time. Beike and Wirth-
Beaumont asked participants to write about unpleasant memories of loss focusing on 
aspects of their experience likely to decrease closure (emotional aspects, aspects 
not understood, or aspects that were currently relevant) or aspects likely to increase 
closure (objective and unemotional facts, aspects that were understood, or aspects 
that were no longer relevant). As predicted, they found that closure ratings were 
higher and fewer emotional details were reported after writing about the memory in a 
way designed to increase closure.  The effect of retelling is further investigated here 
by examining the effect of writing about the memory from a first- or third-person 
visual perspective. 
 
Whether the visual images that come to mind when retrieving 
autobiographical memories come from the first- or third-person perspective has 
received increasing attention in recent years (Rice & Rubin, 2009). The first-person 
perspective refers to the original point of view, as experienced at encoding. The third-
SHUVRQSHUVSHFWLYHUHIHUVWRDQRXWVLGHU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZDVDQRQORRNHUZRXOGKDYH
viewed the original event. Evidence suggests that the perspective taken influences 
the degree of emotional reliving during recall (Sutin & Robins, 2008). It might 
therefore be expected to influence perceived memory closure. Since first-person 
memories are usually more prevalent than third-person memories (Nigro & Neisser, 
1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993), and since the third person perspective has been 
associated with reduced emotional reliving during recall, it was expected that a 
switch in perspective from the first- to the third-person perspective would result in an 





Open and closed memories were compared using the two measures of 
emotional detail used by Beike and Wirth-Beaumont applied both to remembered 
emotion and emotion during recall. In order to provide a fuller picture of the 
characteristics of open and closed memories, additional ratings of the emotional 
experience (intensity of emotion, positive emotion, negative emotion, and physical 
emotional reactions) and other memory characteristics (distancing, reliving, 
frequency of rehearsal, and visual perspective of recall) were also compared. It was 
predicted that closed memories would be rated higher than open memories for the 
degree to which participants felt distanced from the person they were in the memory, 
and that open memories would be rated higher than closed memories for reliving 
during recall.  On the basis of the findings of Beike and Wirth-Beaumont (2005) and 
Savitsky, Medvec, and Gilovich (1997), open memories were expected to have been 
thought about and talked about more often than closed memories.  
 
The prediction relating to visual perspective depends on whether closure is 
more closely associated with remembered emotion or emotion aroused during recall 
since a growing body of evidence shows a complex relationship between memory 
perspective and emotional experiences during remembering. Sutin and Robins 
(2008) suggest the possibility that the degree of emotional arousal during recall 
increases the likelihood of first-person memories, and the degree of emotion 
remembered from the time of encoding increases the likelihood of third-person 
memories.  Thus, if open and closed memories differ primarily in the intensity of 
remembered emotion, then open memories should be more likely to be recalled from 
the third-person, but if they differ mainly in the degree of emotion aroused at recall, 
open memories should be more likely to be recalled from the first-person perspective. 
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In order to maximise the comparability of open and closed memories, 
participants were asked to recall negative interpersonal memories that occurred after 
the age of 18 years but not in the last six months. In the case of closed memories, 
participants were asked to recall a memory that had once been open to ensure that 
the experiences recalled were as similar as possible including a potential to be 
recalled as open. Negative memories were chosen for the study because it is these 
that may impact negatively RQDSHUVRQ¶VPHQWDOZHOO-being and self esteem (Beike et 
al., 2004; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).   
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty two undergraduates (29 female, 3 male) from the 
University of Sunderland participated in the study for course credits.  Their mean age 
was 22 years 5 months (22:5), range = 18-41 years, SD = 6:6.   
 
Materials and Procedure. Participants completed a memory booklet in which 
they provided detailed written accounts of two negative memories, one open and one 
closed. The order of recall was counterbalanced across participants. The instructions 
asked for memories of unpleasant events that occurred at a specific time and place, 
involved interaction with at least one other person, and took place after the age of 18 
but at least six months ago. An open memory was described as µXQILQLVKHG
EXVLQHVV¶DQGDFORVHGPHPRU\DVµDFORVHGERRN¶Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005 
Study 2; Savitsky et al., 1997). Following each account, participants provided their 
age now and at the time of the remembered experience, and then responded to two 
sets of questions and rating items, one relating to their memory, and the other 
relating to their experience during recall.   All rating items used 7 point Likert scales 
where 1 was the lowest rating and 7 was the highest for each characteristic. 
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The memory questions began with the five item closure rating scale used by 
Beike and Wirth-BHDXPRQW µ, KDYH FRPSOHWH FORVXUH RQ WKLV HYHQW¶ µ7KH HYHQW
VHHPV OLNH DQFLHQW KLVWRU\¶ µ7KH HYHQW LV D µFORVHG ERRN¶ WR PH¶ µ7KH HYHQW LV
µXQILQLVKHGEXVLQHVV¶IRUPH¶ (reverse scored), and µ,KDYHSXW the event behind me 
FRPSOHWHO\¶. All closed memories had once been open and for these memories, the 
next question asked for how long the memory had been closed. Participants then 
rated distancing (µ,IHHOOLNHWKHSHUVRQLQWKLVPHPRU\LVDGLIIHUHQWperson than who I 
DPWRGD\¶), and their agreement with four items concerned with emotion at the time 
of the event µ0\HPRWLRQVDWWKHWLPHZHUH« extremely positive, extremely negative, 
extremely intense¶, µI remember the physical/bodily emotional reactions I felt at the 
time (e.g. palpitations, feeling tense, sweating, tears, laughter)¶. They were then 
invited to use a few words or phrases to list details of their memory in each of seven 
categories: people, things, places, sensory details, thoughts, feelings, and actions. 
The category of interest was feelings; additional categories were included (but not 
analysed) so that the focus on feelings was not evident. The final items in this section 
asked for ratings of the frequency of thinking about and talking about the event.  
 
The second set of questions concerned the recall experience and began with 
a rating of reliving µ:KLOHUHPHPEHULQJWKHHYHQWQRZ,IHHODVWKRXJK,DPUHOLYLQJLW
DQGLWLVKDSSHQLQJQRZQRWLQWKHSDVW¶followed by a question asking whether the 
memory was visualised from the first-person perspective (µas I would have seen 
things, through my own eyes, from my field of view¶) or the third-person perspective 
(µDVLWZRXOGKDYHEHHQVHHQE\DQREVHUYHUZDWFKLQJPH¶).  Next, participants rated 
their agreement with four items relating to their emotions during recall: µ:KLOH 
reFDOOLQJ WKH HYHQW QRZ« my emotions are extremely positive, my emotions are 
extremely negative, my emotions are extremely intense¶, µ,Dm experiencing intense 
physical/bodily emotional reactions (e.g. palpitations, feeling tense, sweating, tears, 
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laughter)¶.  Finally, they were asked to list their thoughts and feelings as they recalled 
the memory using a few words or phrases for each.   
 
Results 
Manipulation checks.  Mean closure ratings (across the five closure items) 
were significantly higher for closed memories (M = 5.9, SD = 0.8) than for open 
memories (M = 2.3, SD = 1.1; t(31) = -15.61, p < .001). Moreover, on the 1-7 scale 
where 7 indicated the greatest degree of closure, all open memories were rated less 
than 4 and all closed memories 4 or over. All memories were of interpersonal 
experiences, and the majority concerned relationship issues or illness and death. The 
percentages of memories in these categories were similar for open memories (53% 
relationship, 28% illness and death, 19% other) and closed memories (44% 
relationship, 34% illness and death, 22% other). A related t-test showed no difference 
between open and closed memories in time since the remembered event, t(31) = -
1.46, p = .155.  The mean age of open memories was 2:3, SD = 2:3, and the mean 
age of closed memories was 3:1, SD = 3:4.  The mean number of years for which the 
closed memories had been closed was 2:5, SD = 2:11 (range of 0:6-13 years). 
 
Measures of emotion remembered from the event and emotion during recall.  
Ratings of emotion remembered from the original event and emotion aroused during 
recall for both open and closed memories were examined in a series of 2 x 2 within 
subjects ANOVAs for the four items relating to emotion (see Table 1). Positive 
emotion was rated significantly higher during recall than at the time of the event, 
significantly higher for closed memories than for open memories, and there was a 
significant interaction. Tests of simple main effects revealed no difference between 
open and closed memories for remembered positive emotion, t(31) = 1.72, p =.096, 
but higher ratings for closed than for open memories during recall, t(31) = -4.22, p < 
.001. Significantly lower ratings of negative emotion were reported for emotion 
 12 
aroused during recall than for remembered emotion, and closed memories were 
rated significantly lower in negative emotion than open memories. These main effects 
were qualified by a significant interaction showing a similar pattern to that found for 
positive emotion; no difference between open and closed memories in remembered 
emotion, t(31) = -1.58, p = .125, only in emotion evoked during recall, t(31) = 3.22, p 
= .003, with higher ratings for open than for closed memories.  The same pattern 
emerged for ratings of intensity of emotion.  Ratings were significantly lower for 
emotion during recall than for remembered emotion, and for closed rather than open 
memories, and there was a significant interaction.  Tests of simple main effects 
showed no difference between open and closed memories in remembered emotion, 
t(31) = -1.05, p = .301, but higher ratings for open than for closed memories during 
recall, t(31) = 2.90, p = .007. There was no effect of the closure variable on ratings of 
physical emotion. Ratings were significantly higher for remembered emotion than for 
emotion during recall, but there was no difference between open and closed 
memories, and no interaction. 
Table 1 about here 
 
The number of feelings listed as remembered from the time of the event and 
the number listed as felt during recall were analysed for open and closed memories 
in a 2 x 2 within subjects ANOVA (see Table 1). Significantly more feelings were 
reported from the time of the event (M = 2.8, SE = 0.2) than during recall (M = 1.6, 
SE = 0.2), but there was no effect of closure, and no interaction. 
 
Other memory characteristics.  Open and closed memories differed in ratings of 
reliving and distancing but not in perspective of recall. Ratings of reliving were higher 
for open memories (M = 4.3, SD = 1.9) than for closed memories (M = 2.7, SD = 1.5), 
t(31) = 4.23, p < .001, and ratings of distancing were higher for closed memories (M 
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= 5.0, SD = 1.9) than for open memories (M = 3.9, SD = 1.7), t(31) = -2.56, p = .015. 
There were more first- than third-person memories for both open memories (26 first-
person, 6 third-person) and closed memories (24 first-person, 8 third-person). 
 
Analysis of ratings of rehearsal using a 2 (open vs. closed) x 2 (thinking vs. 
talking) within subjects ANOVA revealed that participants reported thinking about 
their memories (M = 4.9, SE = 0.2) significantly more often than talking about them 
(M = 3.6, SD = 0.3), F(1, 31) = 29.36, MSE = 1.79, p < .001, and that rehearsal was 
rated as more frequent for open (M = 5.0, SE = 0.2) than for closed memories (M = 
3.6, SE = 0.2), F(1, 31) = 39.65, MSE = 1.74, p < .001. There was no interaction, F(1, 
31) = 1.52, MSE = 2.06, p = .227.  
 
Discussion 
The analysis of closure ratings confirmed that not only were closure ratings 
higher for closed than for open memories, there was a clear separation between 
them in mean ratings. The kinds of negative interpersonal experiences reported were 
similar, most of them concerning relationship issues or illness and death. There was 
no difference between them in age, the mean age being two years eight months, 
ruling out potential confounding from the association between memory recency and 
closure (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005). All closed memories were reported to have 
once been open, on average for about eight months.  
 
The comparison between open and closed memories in terms of Beike and 
Wirth-%HDXPRQW¶V two measures of emotional detail clarified that what distinguishes 
open from closed memories is the subjective ratings of emotional response during 
recall rather than the subjective ratings of remembered emotion or the number of 
feelings reported from the time of the event or during recall.. Moreover the results 
showed that open and closed memories are distinguished not simply by rated 
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intensity of emotion, but also by the degree of positive and negative emotion felt 
during recall. Consistent with the finding of less emotional arousal during recall of 
closed memories, ratings showed less reliving and a greater distancing between the 
current and the remembered self during recall of closed rather than open memories. 
 
The perspective of recall was not influenced by perceived closure. Most 
memories, whether open or closed, came to mind from the first-person perspective. 
Sutin and Robins (2008) suggested that greater emotion during recall increases the 
likelihood of first-person memories, so more first-person memories might have been 
expected for open memories. That this was not the case may be because the 
emotion aroused by closed memories was still sufficient to bias recall to the first-
person perspective. Alternatively, the first-person perspective may have arisen from 
the high emotional intensity remembered from the original experience which did not 
differ for open and closed memories. Although Sutin and Robins (2008) suggested 
that high emotion at encoding might increase the likelihood of third-person memories, 
some evidence suggests that the remembered emotion needs to be specifically self-
focused before such a bias becomes apparent HJG¶$UJHPEHDX	YDQGHU/LQGHQ
2008).  
 
Ratings of rehearsal frequency showed that thinking about the memories was 
more common than talking about them and that, as predicted, both kinds of rehearsal 
were more common for open than for closed memories. Research on the effects of 
memory disclosure suggests it leads to changes that might be helpful in transforming 
an open to a closed memory. Such changes include increased distancing and 
increased fading of negative affect (Pasupathi 2007; Pillemer, Desrochers, & Ebanks, 
1998; Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Walker, 2004). Thus, one might explain greater 
rehearsal of open memories as an attempt to increase closure.  Study 2 examines 
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whether manipulating the perspective of recall during written disclosure of open 
unpleasant memories might increase perceived closure of such memories. 
 
Study 2 
In Study 2, participants were asked to recall one open negative memory that 
came to mind spontaneously from the first-person perspective, and the effect of a 
switch to the third-person perspective was compared with a single or repeated 
recounting from the first-person perspective.  
 
There are two alternative predictions regarding the expected consequences 
of the third-person perspective arising from what Sutin and Robins (2008) call the 
Dispassionate Observer and the Salient Self views of third-person recall. The 
Dispassionate Observer view predicts that third-person recall will reduce the emotion 
evoked by a memory by distancing the current self from the recalled self. Robinson¶V 
(1996) suggestion that third-person recall is used to limit recall of emotional detail is 
supported by a variety of evidence suggesting that the third-person perspective 
serves a distancing function (e.g. Libby & Eibach, 2002; McIsaac & Eich, 2002; 
McNamara, Benson, McGeeney, Brown & Albert, 2005; Williams & Moulds, 2007) 
and reduces emotional reliving during recall of negative memories (Kross, Ayduk, & 
Mischel, 2005; Kross & Ayduk, 2008). This is consistent with the functions of points 
of view in fiction where a first-person narrative is said to encourage identification and 
a third-person narrative to encourage spectating (Oatley, 1999).  
 
The alternative prediction arising from the Salient Self view is that the third-
person perspective will increase the emotional response during memory recall by 
strengthening the connection between the current and the recalled self, and by 
increasing attention on the self both visually and emotionally. This view is supported 
by 7HUU\DQG%DUZLFN¶V-1999) study in which third-person memories were rated 
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higher than first-person memories for vividness and emotionality. However, it seems 
mostly to apply to memories for experiences involving a focus on the self or self-
conscious emotions such as pride or shame G¶$UJHmbeau & van der Linden, 2008; 
Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  
 
Sutin and Robins (2008) propose that both views may be supported in 
different circumstances depending on certain moderators such as whether a person 
focuses on similarities or differences between the current and past selves (Libby, 
Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005), and whether the focus is on which emotions were 
experienced or why those emotions occurred (Kross et al., 2005). In the absence of 
such moderators, and in light of evidence showing that switching from a first- to a 
third-person perspective reduces emotional reliving during recall (Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993), the Dispassionate Observer view was expected 
to prevail in this study. Thus, it was predicted that following a switch from first-person 
recounting to third-person recounting, an originally open negative memory would be 
perceived as more closed and less relived, with greater distancing between the 
current and the remembered self, and with less intense, less negative, less physical, 
and more positive emotional arousal during recall. Since these effects may not be 
immediately effective, third-person recounting was repeated on two occasions. There 
were two comparison groups. One recounted the memory from the first-person 
perspective on all three recall occasions, and the other recounted their memory from 
the first-person on a single occasion only. The repeated first-person group was 
included to control for the effects of writing about the memory on three separate 
occasions without a change in perspective. The single first-person group was 
included to check that simply recounting the memory at the start of the study together 
with the passage of time did not influence closure or memory characteristics. 
Participants in the repeated and single first-person recounting groups were not 
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expected to change the way they processed the memory and therefore no changes 
were expected in these groups.  
 
Method 
Participants.  There were 90 participants randomly assigned to one of three 
groups, 30 in each group: repeated third-person (3 male, 27 female), repeated first-
person (9 male, 21 female), and single first-person (5 male, 25 female). The mean 
age of those who disclosed their age was 29:2 (n = 88, SD = 12:4, range = 18-62 
years). Participants were undergraduates from the University of Sunderland who 
volunteered for course credits, and volunteer members of the public.  
 
Materials and Procedure.  Two testing sessions took place 1-2 weeks apart. 
At the first session, all groups began by recalling an open memory of a negative 
experience from the first-person perspective. They were given descriptions of first- 
and third-person perspectives and asked to choose an open negative memory of an 
unpleasant event that occurred at a specific time and place, involved interaction with 
at least one other person, took place after the age of 18 years but at least six months 
ago, and spontaneously came to mind from the first-person perspective. They 
completed a memory booklet similar to the one used in Study 1 in which they wrote a 
detailed description of the remembered event, provided their current age, their age at 
the time of the event, and answered questions and rating items about their memory 
and their recall experience that were the same as in Study 1 except for exclusion of 
the question about perspective. The first session ended at this point for the single 
first-person group. The other two groups undertook two more tasks. First they 
completed a 10-15 minute filler task rating six watch designs against ten adjectival 
descriptions, e.g. youthful / mature, on 7 point scales. They then completed a second 
memory booklet. Participants in the repeated first-person group provided a second 
detailed written description of their memory using the same first-person perspective 
 18 
as before. Participants in the repeated third-person group provided a second detailed 
description, this time from the third- rather than the first-person perspective. All were 
asked to think about the memory from the appropriate perspective before writing 
about it. After writing their account, they completed the same ratings and questions 
as they did after their first recall except for the questions about age.   
 
On the second testing session 1-2 weeks later, participants in the repeated 
first- and third-person groups were asked to think about the memory they had 
recalled at the first testing session from the appropriate perspective before writing a 
third detailed description of it and completing the same ratings and questions as they 
answered after the second recall.  Single first-person participants were asked to bring 
the memory to mind but were given no instructions about perspective and they did 
not write about it again. They simply completed the same ratings and questions as 
the other two groups plus a question about perspective of recall. 7KH WHUP µUHFDOO
RFFDVLRQ¶ LVXVHG for the three times when participants could be asked to recall the 
memory. Note that the single first-person group recalled the memory for the second 




Equivalence of memory characteristics across groups. A series of one way 
between subjects ANOVAs showed that the memories chosen for recall by the three 
groups did not differ in age, degree of closure, negative emotion at the time of the 
event, or frequency of rehearsal (see Table 2). The time since the recalled 
experience varied widely, from 6 months to 43 years (M = 4:7, SD = 6:7, n = 88: two 
participants did not date their memories). All memories were rated as open on the 
first recall occasion (M = 2.6, SD = 1.0), and all were rated as high in negative 
emotion at the time of the event (M = 6.1, SD = 1.5). Ratings indicated that memories 
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had been thought about frequently (M = 6.1, SD = 1.5), and thought about more often 
than they were talked about (M = 3.7, SD = 1.7).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Characteristics of the memory and the recall experience. The purpose of the 
single first-person group was to see whether there were changes in memory 
characteristics in the absence of repeated recounting. The intention was to exclude 
this group from further analyses if there were no differences between measures on 
the first and third recall occasions. However, a series of repeated measures t-tests 
revealed that there were some significant changes so the single first-person group 
was included in further analyses. The t-test results are not reported separately 
because the same comparisons are included as part of the analyses that follow.  
 
Because the single first-person group was included in the analyses but did 
not provide data on the second recall occasion, the primary analysis was a series of 
mixed 3 (group) x 2 (recall occasion 1, 3) ANOVAs. Significant interactions were 
explored by examining changes over time for the three groups separately using 
paired t-tests.  When doing so, the data provided by the repeated first- and third-
person groups on the second recall occasion was included to allow all available data 
to be used to determine when changes took place. For ease of reporting, only 
significant t-test results are reported. The mean ratings for all recall occasions and 
the results of the 3 (group) x 2 (recall occasion 1, 3) ANOVAs are shown in Table 3, 
first for characteristics of the memory (closure, distancing, and measures of 
remembered emotion), then for characteristics of the recall experience (reliving, and 
measures of emotion during recall).  
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Table 3 about here 
 
Characteristics of the memory:  Analysis of the closure ratings showed a 
significant increase in closure from the first to the third occasion qualified by a 
significant interaction. Further analysis suggested this arose from a greater increase 
in closure for the two repeated recounting groups (repeated first-person: t(29) = -
4.26, p <.001; repeated third-person: t(29) = -5.00, p <.001) than for the single first-
person group, t(29) = -2.60, p <.05. The repeated first-person group showed no 
increase from the first to the second occasion but a significant increase from the 
second to the third, t(29) = -3.18, p <.01, and the repeated third-person group 
showed significant increases from the first to the second, t(29) = -3.25, p <.01, and 
from the second to the third, t(29) = -2.98, p <.01. 
 
The distancing ratings increased significantly from the first to the third 
occasion and there was also a significant interaction. Further examination of the 
interaction showed no change in ratings across time for the repeated or single first-
person groups, only for the repeated third-person group which increased significantly 
between the first and third (t(29) = -2.83, p <.01), and second and third occasions 
(t(29) = -3.36, p <.01). 
 
No significant effects emerged from the analysis of ratings of remembered 
positive emotion. All other measures of remembered emotion showed a significant 
main effect of recall occasion and / or a significant interaction. A significant 
interaction emerged from the analysis of ratings of remembered negative emotion.  
Ratings from the single first-person group did not change but those from the repeated 
first-person group increased significantly from the second to the third occasion, t(29) 
= -2.09, p <.05, while those from the repeated third-person group decreased 
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significantly from the first to the third occasion, t(29) = 2.07, p <.05. Ratings of 
remembered emotional intensity decreased significantly from the first to the third 
occasion but this was qualified by a significant interaction. Further analysis showed a 
significant decrease from the first to the third occasion only for the repeated third-
person group, t(29) = 2.16, p <.05. Ratings of remembered physical emotion, like 
remembered intensity, showed a significant decrease from the first to the third 
occasion qualified by a significant interaction. The two repeated recounting groups 
showed significant decreases in remembered physical emotion from the first to the 
third occasion (first-person: t(29) = 2.5, p <.05, third-person: t(29) = 4.25, p <.001) 
while the single first-person group showed only a marginally significant decrease, 
t(29) = 2.05, p = .05.  The repeated third-person group also showed a significant 
decrease from the first to the second occasion, t(29) = 2.73, p <.05.  The number of 
remembered feelings decreased significantly from the first (M = 3.6, SE = .18) to the 
third recall occasion (M = 3.2, SE = .16) with no other significant effects.  
 
Characteristics of the recall experience: Ratings of reliving decreased 
significantly from the first (M = 4.4, SE = .19) to the third (M = 3.6, SE = .19) occasion 
but there was no effect of group and no interaction. Analysis of positive emotion 
ratings revealed significant main effects of group and recall occasion, and a 
significant interaction. Pairwise comparisons showed ratings were significantly higher 
for the repeated first-person group than for the single first-person group (p <.05), and 
significantly higher on the third occasion compared with the first. The interaction was 
due to a significant increase in ratings from the first to the third occasion for the 
single first-person group, t(29) = -2.09, p <.05, no changes over time for the repeated 
first-person group, and significant increases from the first to the second, t(29) = -
2.45, p <.05, and from the first to the third occasion, t(29) = -3.14, p <.01, for the 
repeated third-person group. Analysis of negative emotion ratings revealed two 
significant main effects with higher ratings reported by the single first-person group 
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than by the repeated first-person group, and higher ratings on the first occasion (M = 
4.8, SE = .18) than on the third (M = 4.2, SE = .18). Analyses of emotional intensity 
ratings and physical emotion ratings both showed a single main effect of recall 
occasion and in each case ratings were higher on the first occasion (intensity M = 
4.7, SE = .16, physical M = 3.5, SE = .21) than on the third (intensity M = 4.0, SE = 
.16, physical M = 2.9, SE = .18). No significant effects emerged from the analysis of 
the number of feelings reported during recall. 
 
Regression analysis. A regression analysis was conducted to examine the 
predictors of changes in memory closure over time. As well as the increase in 
closure, nine other measures changed significantly from the first to the third recall 
occasion. In order to examine whether any of these changes predicted the increase 
in closure, a difference score (Recall 3-Recall 1) was calculated for each variable that 
yielded a significant main effect of recall occasion in the 3 x 2 ANOVAs shown in 
Table 3. To provide sufficient participant numbers for this analysis, and because 
there was no effect of group on closure ratings, data was collapsed across groups. 
Preliminary correlation analyses revealed a significant negative correlation between 
the change scores for positive emotion at recall and those for negative emotion at 
recall (r = -.633, p <.01) so the two measures were combined into a single measure 
of emotion change by subtracting the change in negative emotion at recall from the 
change in positive emotion at recall. A high score indicated a large change in both 
positive and negative emotion. The difference scores were entered into a stepwise 
multiple regression analysis with closure change as the outcome variable and the 
following change scores as predictor variables: distancing, remembered intensity, 
remembered physical emotion, the number of feelings remembered from the time of 
the event, reliving, combined positive and negative emotion at recall, intensity of 
emotion at recall, and physical emotion at recall.  As Table 4 shows, the change in 
closure was predicted by the combined change in positive and negative emotion 
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during recall (R2 = .29, p <.001), and reliving (R2 = . 05, p <.05).  The greatest impact 
on increased closure came from a combined measure of increased positive emotion 
and decreased negative emotion during recall, while a decrease in the feeling of 
reliving had a smaller but still significant impact. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Frequency of reported emotions.  The particular emotions remembered and 
aroused at recall were examined on the first and third recall occasions across all 
participants. Table 5 shows the ten emotions most commonly reported. The most 
common negative emotion from the original experience was anger. Sadness, feeling 
upset and fear were also common. Anger, sadness and feeling upset were also 
commonly reported during recall but fear was much less frequent. Most emotions 
were reported less frequently during recall. The exceptions were sadness and relief 
(the only positive emotion) which were reported more often during recall. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Perspective.  Scrutiny of the memory descriptions confirmed that when 
participants were instructed to use a particular perspective, all complied. The first 
person singular pronoun was commonly used in first-person memory narratives, e.g. 
³0\VRQZDVPRQWKVROGDQGLQKLVEDE\VHDW. I remember seeing him thrown up, 
and then down´. In third-person narratives, participants referred to themselves as 
aQRWKHU SHUVRQ XVLQJ µKH¶ RU µVKH¶ WKHLU QDPH RU LQLWLDOV RU WKH\ GHVFULEHG VHHLQJ
WKHPVHOYHVLQWKHPHPRU\HJ³,FDQVHHP\VHOIVLWWLQJ LQWKHFRUQHURIWKHURRP´
Participants in the single first-person group did not provide a narrative on the third 
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recall occasion nor were they told which perspective to take during recall. All except 




Comparisons between the groups showed that, on the first recall occasion, 
the memories were equivalent across groups in age, degree of closure, remembered 
negative emotion from the time of the event, and frequency of rehearsal. All 
memories were low in closure and high in remembered negative emotion. The 
emotions frequently reported from the time of the experience were anger, sadness, 
feeling upset, and fear. Prior rehearsal of the memory was commonly reported, more 
often by thinking about the memory rather than talking about it, although seven 
participants reported never having disclosed the memory before. 
 
The analysis of change from the first to the third recall occasion by group 
showed no changes over time for any of the three groups in ratings of remembered 
positive emotion which remained low on all occasions, and no difference in the 
number of feelings reported during recall. On average, around two feelings were 
reported during recall, the most common being anger, sadness, feeling upset, relief 
and regret. The other measured characteristics did change over time, some 
consistently across groups, and others differing between groups.  
 
While there were some differences in the degree and timing of changes, 
ratings of closure increased over time not only in the third-person recounting group, 
but in all three groups. The regression analysis revealed that the most important 
predictor of the increase in closure was the measure that combined the increase in 
positive emotion and decrease in negative emotion during recall. The only other 
predictor was a decrease in the feeling of reliving during recall. The other memory 
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characteristics that changed over time (increase in distancing, decrease in 
remembered intensity, remembered physical emotion, number of feelings 
remembered from the time of the event, intensity of emotion at recall, and physical 
emotion at recall) did not make any further contribution to predicting the increase in 
closure. These results are consistent with those of Study 1 and show that it was the 
subjective experience of emotion during recall that was the most important 
determinant of closure. 
 
The main aim of Study 2 was to examine the effect on memory closure of 
writing about an open unpleasant memory from the third-person perspective. It was 
predicted that switching from the first- to the third-person perspective would result in 
the initially open memory being rated as more closed and less relived, with greater 
distance between the current and the remembered self, and with less intense, less 
negative, less physical, and more positive emotional arousal during recall compared 
with single or repeated recounting from the first-person perspective.  All these 
characteristics changed in the direction predicted following the switch to the third-
person but, contrary to prediction, the changes were not always confined to the 
repeated third-person recounting group.  
 
All three manipulations led to increases in perceived closure. The shift 
towards the closed end of the scale was not dramatic; even the highest mean ratings 
were still only at about the midpoint of the scale by the third recall occasion. 
Nevertheless, the results show that just bringing the memory to mind and writing 
about it from the original first-person perspective on a single occasion was sufficient 
for participants to report increased closure 1-2 weeks later. The increase was even 
greater when the memory was brought to mind and written about on three occasions. 
Those who repeated their initial first-person recounting reported increased closure by 
the third occasion, while those who switched to the third-person reported an increase 
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by the second recounting, with another increase by the third recounting. Thus, as 
predicted, a switch from the first- to the third-person perspective was effective in 
increasing the perceived closure of unpleasant open memories and each of the third-
person recountings led to a significant increase in closure. In addition, only 
participants in the repeated third-person group showed increased distancing, 
supporting previous findings associating distancing with third-person recall (e.g. 
Libby & Eibach, 2002; McIsaac & Eich, 2002; McNamara et al., 2005; Williams & 
Moulds, 2007). While these results seem to support the Dispassionate Observer view 
that the third-person perspective serves a distancing function and reduces the 
emotion evoked by a memory (e.g. Robinson, 1996), thus leading to closure, the 
third-person perspective alone cannot be responsible for the increase in closure 




The aim of Study 1 was to clarify the association between the perceived 
closure of memories and emotional detail at encoding and recall. Comparison 
between open memories and closed memories that had once been open showed that 
what distinguished them was the subjective experience of emotion during recall, not 
the variety of feelings reported during recall or encoding, and not the remembered 
experience of emotion at the time of encoding. Both open and closed memories were 
remembered as intensely emotional, highly negative, with high levels of physical 
emotional responses and little positive emotion at the time they occurred. Both 
aroused less emotion during recall than at the time of the event. They did not differ in 
the number of feelings reported from the time of encoding or at recall, and fewer 
feelings were reported for both during recall. However, compared with closed 
memories, open memories aroused more intense, more negative, and less positive 
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emotion during recall. Thus, greater closure was associated with more positive, less 
negative and less intense emotion during recall. 
 
The regression analysis in Study 2 confirmed the association between closure 
and emotion experienced during recall. The most important predictor of closure 
change over time was the combined increase in positive emotion and decrease in 
negative emotion during recall, with an additional effect of decreased reliving during 
recall. Even though the number of remembered feelings decreased along with the 
increase in closure, this change did not predict the increase in closure. Thus, it 
seems that the aspect of emotional detail that is important in determining perceived 
memory closure is the subjective experience of emotion during recall.  Beike and 
Wirth-Beaumont (2005) argued that closure was determined by both subjective 
ratings of emotional intensity during recall and the variety of feelings remembered 
from the time of encoding, with the former possibly more important for recent 
memories and the latter for distant memories, but these results suggest that it is the 
subjective experience of emotion during recall that is important for determining 
closure of memories of a variety of ages. Moreover, it is not simply emotional 
intensity that is important; it is also the valence of the emotion and the accompanying 
feeling of reliving the experience. Study 1 also revealed a greater feeling of 
distancing between the current and the remembered self for closed memories, 
consistent with a reduced sense of reliving during recall. 
 
In Study 1 open memories were reported to have been rehearsed more 
frequently than closed memories. This is consistent with previous research (e.g. 
Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005) and may reflect attempts to move the open 
memories towards the closed end of the continuum. However, this explanation 
applies more readily to studies in which the closed memories may never have been 
open. It deserves further consideration before being applied here. The closed 
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memories in Study 1 had all once been open and therefore had already moved 
successfully along the continuum to become closed. One might therefore expect that 
they would have been rehearsed more frequently than the open memories. That this 
is not the case may be because it is not rehearsal or disclosure per se that leads to 
reduced affect and greater closure, but how the memory is thought about or talked 
about. It may be that if disclosure involves mere rehearsal without achieving greater 
understanding or resolution, then it will not lead to greater closure, just as brooding 
rumination is less beneficial than reflective rumination (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). It could be that the closed (but once open) memories in Study I 
are ones for which rehearsal was productive, and the open memories are ones that, 
despite frequent rehearsal, are not transformed by the process. The results of Study 
2 support the notion that the way in which memories are recounted influences their 
perceived closure. While, contrary to prediction, changes in closure and other 
memory characteristics were not confined to the repeated third-person recounting 
group, the three kinds of recounting did not yield identical effects.  For example, only 
participants in the repeated third-person group reported increased distancing and 
decreased remembered negative emotion and emotional intensity.  
 
Nevertheless, it was the case that all three kinds of recounting led to an 
increase in perceived closure and possible reasons for this need to be explored. The 
impact of a memory on current emotions, and thus the degree to which it feels open 
or closed, depends on a number of factors including the extent to which an individual 
understands the remembered event (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005), its relevance 
or personal significance (Beike & Wirth-Beaumont, 2005; Robinson, 1996; 
Sonnemans & Frijda, 1995), how it relates to their most important current goals and 
self identity (Singer & Salovey, 1993), and how it relates to their life story (McAdams, 
2001).  Some of these other factors may have influenced perceived closure in this 
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study. This might explain why, contrary to prediction, repeated third-person 
recounting was not singularly effective in increasing closure. 
 
For participants who repeatedly recounted their memories, from either the 
first- or third-person perspective, the increase in closure and the reduction in reliving 
and emotional arousal during recall might be explained by the increase in 
understanding that can be facilitated by constructing a narrative on more than one 
occasion. Pennebaker and colleagues have presented extensive evidence to show 
physical and mental health benefits following repeated sessions of expressive writing 
in which people express their deepest emotions and thoughts (e.g. Pennebaker & 
Chung, 2007; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Smyth, 1998). It has been suggested that 
the benefits may be partially a result of closure (Pennebaker, 1997). This would 
appear to directly contradict Beike and Wirth-Beaumont¶V(2005) finding that closure 
increased after participants wrote about their experience with no focus on their 
emotions. Beike and Wirth-Beaumont suggest the contradiction may be explained by 
the difference between emotional detail in written narratives of memories (the focus 
RI3HQQHEDNHU¶VZRUNDQGHPRWLRQDOGHWDLOLQWKHPHPRULHVWKHPVHOYHVWKHIRFXVRI
Beike & Wirth-%HDXPRQW¶V FRQFHUQ SRLQWLQJ RXW WKDW WKH WZR DUH QRW DOZD\V
congruent.  Another possibility, however, is that the contradiction is not as great as 
first appears.  
 
The opportunity to repeatedly write about an experience in the Pennebaker 
paradigm may allow some people to alter the way they write and think about their 
experience in ways that encourage closure. Evidence suggests that those who 
benefit most from repeated expressive writing are those whose accounts change in 
style over successive recountings as they construct a narrative. The changes 
associated with the greatest health improvements include increases in causal 
language and insight words, indicating a focus on understanding the experience 
 30 
(Klein & Boals, 2001; Pennebaker, Mayne & Francis, 1997) and flexible switching 
between first person singular pronouns (I, me) and other personal pronouns (e.g. we, 
she, you, they) indicating changes in perspective (Campbell & Pennebaker, 2003).  
In other words, those who show the most benefit do not simply continue to write an 
emotionally expressive account from their own perspective but, even without explicit 
instruction, they change their writing style over repeated recountings in ways similar 
to those used by Beike and Wirth-Beaumont to encourage closure. As Tversky and 
Marsh (2000) have shown, the way a memory is retold influences the way it is later 
recalled. Thus it is possible that simply writing about the memory on several 
occasions, whatever the instructed perspective, may lead to greater understanding 
and thus influence memory closure. This might explain why the changes in closure 
and other memory characteristics following repeated first-person recounting in Study 
2 were almost as great as those following repeated third-person recounting.  
 
An explanation based on the benefits of repeated writing cannot apply to the 
participants in the single first-person group because they only wrote about their 
memory on one occasion. The simple act of recalling, rather than writing about, the 
memories is also unlikely to have led to the observed changes because ratings show 
they had often been thought about before the study began yet had remained open. 
Instead, it seems that a single act of converting the memory into a narrative 
description influenced memory characteristics, although whether this was due to the 
narrative construction itself and / or subsequent processing of the memory in the 
interval between the first and third recall occasions cannot be established. It may be 
that writing about the memory on the first occasion encouraged further processing of 
the memory that led to increased understanding and thus increased closure in a way 
that previous rehearsal without writing had not. No information was collected about 
how much time was spent thinking about the memory between sessions and how 
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much meaning-making or other kinds of autobiographical reasoning (McLean & 
Fournier, 2008) this may have provoked. This needs to be explored in further studies. 
 
Even though the effect of repeated third-person recounting was more similar 
than expected to the effects of single or repeated first-person recounting, it did differ 
in some respects. The increase in closure was evident sooner, and there were 
decreases in remembered negative emotion and emotional intensity and an increase 
in distancing not observed in the other two groups. Thus, of all the manipulations, 
repeated third-person recounting had the most influence on perceived closure and 
remembered emotion. This is consistent with the suggestion that the third-person 
perspective facilitates a decrease in emotional detail and more dispassionate recall 
(e.g. Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993), and is similar to the 
µGHFHQWUHG SHUVSHFWLYH¶ LQ PLQGIXOQHVV EDVHG FRJQLWLYH WKHUDS\ LQ ZKLFK SHRSOH
observe their thoughts and feelings at a distance and without judgement (Segal, 
Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). The third-person perspective has been shown to lead 
people to more dispositional (rather than situational) attributions for their own past 
behaviour (e.g. Frank & Gilovich, 1989) and to encourage individuals to focus on the 
causes of events and how they felt, and to assess the experience from a broader 
perspective (e.g. Kross & Ayduk, 2008). These factors may account for the particular 
effectiveness of third-person recounting for increasing closure. 
   
If memories that are open can become more closed, it is possible that they 
can also move from the closed to the open end of the continuum. For example, it has 
been suggested that as memories are retrieved, they are appraised for congruence 
with the self and for threat to self-esteem (Sutin & Robins, 2008). Thus, if something 
happens to change our previous understanding of an experience so that a memory 
that was appraised as no threat to self-esteem becomes threatening, our memory for 
that experience might move from closed to open. In other words, if closure depends 
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on how a memory is appraised on each recall occasion, this may change over time 
as goals and understanding change. A poignant example of the influence of 
subsequent knowledge and understanding on the quality of the remembered 
experience is provided by Elizabeth McCracken (2009: 21-22) writing about her 
H[SHULHQFH RI WKH VWLOOELUWK RI KHU ILUVW FKLOG ³WLPH FKDQJHG EDFNZDUGV DQG QRZ«
every single day of my first pregnancy, when I was laughing till I was paralytic at my 
own jokes about what to name the baby, when I was addressing fond monologues to 
my stomach as I drove a horrific old Ford Escort through the French countryside, he 
ZDVDOUHDG\GHDG«DQGRXUKHDUWVZHUHDOUHDG\EURNHQ´ 
 
As Study 1 demonstrated, the recall of open memories is accompanied by 
more intense, more negative and less positive emotion than the recall of closed 
memories. Furthermore, recalling open memories increases ruminative self-
awareness and can lead to anxiety, depression and a decrease in self-esteem (Beike 
et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).  It is therefore important to find out more about 
how to encourage memory closure. The studies reported here suggest that providing 
explicit instructions to repeatedly recount a remembered experience, particularly from 
the third-person perspective, may be one way of helping people to resolve open 
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Table 1 
Study 1:  Measures of remembered emotion and emotion during recall for open and closed memories and results of ANOVAs 
 Open 
memories 
M      (SD) 
Closed 
memories 
M      (SD) 
Remembered / during recall 
 
F(1, 31)       MSE         p 
Open / Closed memories 
 
F (1, 31)     MSE        p 
Interaction 
 
F(1, 31)       MSE         p 
Rated positive emotion 
      Remembered 








   49.78        1.54       <.001 
 
    8.83        1.49       <.01 
 
   21.88        1.33       <.001 
Rated negative emotion  
      Remembered 








   57.93        2.21       <.001 
 
    4.91        1.63       <.05 
 
   12.75        1.66        .001 
Rated intensity of emotion  
      Remembered 








   65.14        2.35       <.001 
 
    6.98        1.79       <.05 
 
     4.43        1.02       <.05 
Rated physical emotion 
      Remembered 








 120.23        3.00       <.001 
 
    3.34        2.25        .08 
 
     2.00        1.13         .170 
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Note: Ratings range from 1-7. 
Number of feelings 
      Remembered 








   25.62        1.58       <.001 
 
    0.38        1.29        .54 
 




Study 2: Characteristics of the memory recalled by the three groups on the first recall occasion and results of ANOVAs 
 Repeated 










MSE df p 
 




2, 85 .387 
Closure rating  
 
2.9 (1.0) 2.3 (1.2) 2. 5 (0.9) 2.48 1.04 2, 87 .090 
Ratings of remembered 
negative emotion  
5.9 (1.6) 6.1 (1.6) 6.1 (1.4) 0.24 
 
2.32 2, 87 .791 
Rated frequency of thinking 
about the memory  
4.7 (1.4) 5.0 (1.3) 5.1 (1.2) 0.71 
 
1.60 2, 87 .493 
Rated frequency of talking 
about the memory  
3.4 (1.8) 3.9 (1.6) 3.9 (1.7) 0.65 
 
2.92 2, 87 .524 
Note: Ratings range from 1-7. 
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Table 3. 
Study 2:  Characteristics of the memory and the recall experience reported by the three groups and results of 3 x 2 ANOVAs 
 Repeated 
1st person 
   M     (SD 
Repeated 
3rd person 
  M     (SD) 
Single 
 1st person 
  M      (SD) 
Effect of Group 
 F(2, 87)  MSE       p 
Effect of recall 1, 3 
 F(2, 87)  MSE       p  
Interaction 








  2.9   (1.0) 
  3.1   (1.2) 
  3.5   (1.2) 
 
 
  2.3   (1.2) 
  3.0   (1.5) 
  3.6   (1.7) 
 
 
  2.5   (0.9) 
 
  2.9   (1.0) 
 
 
   1.93     2.30      .151 
 
 
  47.78     0.57     <.001 
 
 






  3.9   (2.1) 
  3.9   (1.9) 
  4.0   (1.8) 
 
  4.0   (2.0) 
  4.2   (1.9) 
  4.8   (2.0) 
 
  4.0   (1.9) 
 
  4.0   (1.8) 
 
   0.60     6.30      .552 
 
   4.01     1.09     <.05 
 
   3.26     1.09     <.05 
Remembered emotion ratings 





  1.8   (1.5)  
  2.2   (1.6) 
 
 
  1.6   (1.5) 
  1.8   (1.3) 
 
 
































  1.8   (1.3) 
 
  5.9   (1.6) 
  5.7   (1.7) 
  6.2   (1.1)   
 
  6.2   (1.1) 
  5.9   (1.5) 
  5.7   (1.8) 
 
  6.1   (1.3) 
  5.8   (1.4) 
  5.6   (1.2) 
 
  3.6   (1.7) 
  3.2   (1.7) 
  3.1   (1.5) 
  1.8   (1.4) 
 
  6.1   (1.6) 
  6.1   (1.3) 
  5.8   (1.5) 
 
  6.4   (0.9) 
  6.1   (1.3) 
  5.7   (1.7) 
 
  6.6   (0.9) 
  6.0   (1.1) 
  5.4   (1.7) 
 
  3.4   (1.4) 
  2.6   (1.4) 
  3.1   (1.5) 
  1.6   (1.4) 
 
  6.1   (1.4) 
 
  6.1   (1.2) 
 
  6.1   (1.4) 
 
  6.3   (0.8) 
 
  6.1   (1.3) 
 
  5.7   (1.4) 
 
  3.7   (1.9) 
 
  3.4   (1.6) 
 
    
   0.12     3.53      .887 
 
 
    
   0.30     2.38      .744 
 
 
    
   0.14     2.44      .870 
 
 
   
   0.26     4.19      .768 
 
    
   0.06     0.38      .810 
 
 
    
   4.37     1.22     <.05 
 
 
   
  27.97     0.84     <.001 
 
 
   
    6.88     0.93     =.01 
 
   
   3.55     0.38     <.05 
 
 
    
   3.20     1.22     <.05 
 
 
   
    3.58     0.84     <.05 
 
 
    
   0.18     0.93      .832 
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  Rated emotion during recall 













  4.0   (1.9) 
  3.8   (2.1) 




  3.7   (1.9) 
  3.1   (1.8) 
  3.6   (1.7) 
 
  4.1   (1.7) 
  4.7   (1.8) 
  3.8   (1.5) 
 
  4.5   (1.7) 
  4.5   (1.9)   
 
 
  4.8   (1.5) 
  4.4   (2.1) 




  2.3   (1.2) 
  3.1   (1.8) 
  3.5   (1.9) 
 
  5.1   (1.5) 
  4.7   (1.9)   
  4.2   (2.0) 
 
  4.9   (1.6) 
  4.5   (1.9) 
 
 
  4.4   (1.9) 
   




  2.4   (1.7) 
 
  2.8   (1.6) 
 
  5.3   (1.6) 
 
  4.7   (1.5) 
 









    
   3.97     4.28     <.05 
 
 
    
   3.77     4.32     <.05 
 
 
    










  10.34     1.19     <.01 
 
 
   






























            No. of feelings  
Recall 1  
Recall 2 
Recall 3 
  4.2   (1.4) 
 
  3.5   (1.9) 
  3.7   (2.1) 
  3.1   (1.5) 
 
  2.2   (1.5) 
  2.5   (1.7) 
  2.1   (1.6) 
  3.8   (1.9) 
 
  3.9   (2.0) 
  4.0   (1.9) 
  2.9   (2.1) 
 
  2.5   (1.4) 
  2.3   (1.5) 
  2.1   (1.1) 
  3.8   (1.2) 
 
  3.1   (2.0) 
 
  2.6   (1.5) 
 
  2.2   (1.2) 
 
  2.1   (1.4) 
 
    
   0.89     5.12      .415 
 
 
    




  10.85     1.72     =.001 
 
 
    
   1.65     0.86      .203        
 
    




  0.86     0.86      .428 
Note: Ratings range from 1-7. 
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Table 4.  
Study 2: Summary of regression analysis for predictor variables of closure ratings 
 
Variable B SE B ǃ 
Combined positive and 
negative emotion during recall 
.188 .037 .465*** 
Reliving -.149 .060 -.230* 
* p <.05 
*** p <.001
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Table 5.  
Frequency of the most commonly reported specific emotions remembered from the event and felt during recall on recall occasions 1 
and 3  
 
Emotion 
Remembered from the event Experienced during recall 
Recall 1 Recall 3 Recall 1 Recall 3 
Anger 
Sadness 
Feeling upset 
Fear 
Hurt 
Guilt 
Anxiety 
Relief 
Frustration 
Regret 
37 
21 
19 
18 
14 
13 
13 
4 
8 
4 
34 
21 
25 
15 
10 
10 
7 
5 
10 
4 
25 
24 
15 
3 
2 
6 
5 
9 
4 
8 
16 
30 
8 
2 
5 
6 
3 
10 
4 
8 
 
